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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to create a general framework
that a pension plan sponsor can utilize to determine
pragmatic allocation strategies for real estate investment.
The framework is created using a combination of the
principles of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), an analysis of
various factors that influence plan strategy and conventional
wisdom from the real estate industry.
This paper describes the historical perspective of pension
plan real estate investment, the evolution of MPT, barriers
to implementation of MPT to real estate and data currently
available. It also discusses the various factors of
influence on a plan's real estate strategy and considers the
likely evolution of pension plan real estate investment.
Finally, a framework is presented that, incorporating the
factors of influence, will help a plan sponsor to
rationalize the decision of identifying pragmatic allocation
strategies.
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CHAPTER I: Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to create a general framework
that a pension plan sponsor can utilize to determine
pragmatic allocation strategies for real estate investment.
The framework is created using a combination of the
principles of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), an analysis of
various factors that influence plan strategy and conventional
wisdom from the real estate industry.
Large pension plans were drawn into the world of real estate
in the 1980's because of the perceived opportunity for
lucrative returns and diversification benefits. The
continued growth in employee contributions and in targeted
real estate allocations may lead to marked increases in plan
real estate investment over the next decade. The impact of
even small percentage increases in plan allocations to real
estate would be substantial. The U.S. Department of Labor
estimates plan assets to be approximately $2.6 trillion. At
this level, even a 1% additional allocation to real estate
would expand existing plan holdings by approximately 25% or
$26 billion. This would be the equivalent of purchasing a
$500 million property in every state in the U.S. This $26
billion investment would expand the existing pension real
estate pool by more than 25%.
Over the last several decades, investors in securities have
implemented sophisticated investment techniques for
diversification, based largely on a body of academic
literature. In contrast, investors have for years considered
real estate on a deal by deal basis, using negotiation skills
rather than quantitative portfolio approaches for achieving
diversification. In the last five years, however, both
practitioners and academics have begun to attempt the
application of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) logic to real
estate investment. Much of the current discussion in the
industry centers around the tension between the "bottom-up,"
deal driven approach and the "top-down," portfolio driven
approach.
The pension plan sponsor's fiduciary duty has been
interpreted to include acting as a "prudent expert" in
investment strategy (4). Considering this duty in the face
of waning returns in their real estate portfolios, many plans
have begun to recognize the need to institute sophisticated
diversification strategies similar to those used in
securities investment. These strategies have the potential
to protect existing allocations and to increase future
allocations to real estate.
Theory and practice for achieving and maintaining an
efficient portfolio are still evolving. Investors must
choose from among classifications offering different "units
of diversification" as well as from among various investment
vehicles. These units of diversification include markets
segmented by location, economic area, lease duration and
property type. The primary investment vehicles used by plans
include open and closed-end commingled real estate funds
(CREFs), separate accounts, direct investments and REITs.
Only the largest pension plans in the country generally have
in-house staff to manage real estate assets and make
allocation decisions. Most plans rely on investment advisors
that act as real estate money managers. These advisors
acquire, manage and dispose of real property for plans, and
often make many allocation decisions. Many plans have also
come to rely on consultants to select, screen and evaluate
the relative performance of advisors. However, neither
advisors or consultants have been used to create overall real
estate investment strategies; they are typically utilized
to make specific allocation decisions.
The current activities of several large plan sponsors and
investment advisors imply that the strategy for
diversification will differ depending on a variety of
influencing factors. These factors include portfolio
objectives, management characteristics, the type of plan, the
size of the real estate allocation, various asset
characteristics, plan objectives, plan size, the political
and social environment, and regulatory oversight. The
relationship between the size of a plan and certain
characteristics of real estate investment vehicles is an
important determinant of strategy. The divisibility of a
particular investment vehicle will influence the ability of
plans of different sizes to implement certain strategies.
The framework created in this paper looks at this
relationship in concert with the other factors to identify
allocation strategies for plans of $50 million to $20 billion
in assets.
In general, the investment options suggested in the framework
and analysis of strategies are intuitive; more strategies are
available to large plans with sizeable real estate
allocations. However, the framework quantifies the size that
a plan must achieve before various strategies are available.
It is interesting to note that many strategies frequently
discussed in the literature will only be available to the
largest plans in the U.S.
Chapter Two of this paper considers the historical
perspective of pension plan real estate investment, the
evolution of MPT, barriers to implementation of MPT to real
estate, and data currently available. Chapter Three
discusses the various factors of influence on a plan's real
estate strategy and considers the likely evolution of pension
plan real estate investment. Chapter Four presents a
framework that, incorporating the factors of influence from
Chapter Three, will help a plan sponsor to rationalize the
decision of identifying pragmatic allocation strategies.
Finally, Chapter Five provides conclusions from the various
analyses performed.
Historical Perspective
PENSION PLAN REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT
Pension plan real estate investment has not moved forward
with a distinct strategy. In the instance of most plans, it
has just evolved. Plans have joined large commingled funds
to bring real estate into their portfolio. These funds
typically require initial investments ranging from $1-$100
million. Many plans decide to take on additional risk for a
higher return on their investment. Funds specializing in
particular property types and geographic areas, with varying
forms of financial and leasing risk are often the plan's
first foray into riskier forms of real estate. The larger
plans may subsequently develop their own real estate staff
and invest directly, searching for even higher risk-adjusted
levels of return.
Regardless of size, most major plans prefer to allocate
across advisors, attempting to diversify by judgement and
style. Often, real consultants are utilized to make these
allocation decisions. Unfortunately, this and other methods
of allocation often amount to no more than "naive
diversification." Plans do not usually consider the
correlation of investment returns either within real estate
or with the balance of the plan's portfolio. In defense of
these investors, they are usually making use of the limited
tools of analysis that are available. However, recent papers
present compelling evidence for more sophisticated methods
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CHAPTER II:
that raise questions about the level of diversification of
existing portfolios.
MPT EVOLUTION
The application of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) to real
estate has been a topic of discussion for the last ten years.
The central argument surrounds the ability to apply the
quantitative techniques, which for years have dominated the
securities market, to the very different world of real estate
(3). Even some of the top investment advisory firms in the
industry cater to "deal people," more comfortable with making
decisions on a transaction level, than with analyzing
portfolio ramifications of individual investments. These
strategies may continue to dominate the private development
community. However, unsophisticated mechanisms for
evaluating portfolio risk are in conflict with the fiduciary
duties required of pension plan sponsors. This fact is
magnified by recent studies by Hartzell, Hekman and Miles
(12) and Hartzell, Shulman and Wurtzebach (13) that present
convincing evidence in support of improved methods of real
estate diversification. Additionally, some prominent pension
plans and advisory firms including the Prudential Realty
Group, Equitable Real Estate, Aldrich, Eastman and Waltch,
and the RREEF Funds, have actually begun to implement MPT
techniques to their portfolios (15).
At the heart of MPT is the goal of achieving the highest
return on investment for a given level of risk (7). However,
risk is often difficult to assess; this is particularly true
in the case of real estate investment. Risk is defined as
the variability of the return on an investment.
Nevertheless, the overall risk of a portfolio cannot be
determined by looking at the individual returns of assets.
Markowitz recognized that the returns of individual assets
are interrelated (20). Although individual projects will
have risk that can't be diversified away, he noted that the
correct allocation of assets with low or negative
relationships or "correlations" can reduce portfolio risk.
MPT promotes constructing portfolios by selecting from the
investments available that will provide the optimum
combination of expected return and estimated risk (23).
Exhibit 1 illustrates an efficient frontier of optimal
portfolio selections. For each level of risk measured on the
X-axis of the graph, the Y-axis reflects the maximum return
that can be achieved. The efficient frontier is the spectrum
representing the combination of investments providing the
maximum return for each level of risk. Rational investors
will not choose any point below the curve, since a higher
return would be available at the same level of risk. As
investors moves up the curve, they will receive a higher
risk-adjusted level of return. This type of graph could be
used to look at efficient portfolios of all investment
options or at portfolios of specific investments.
Sharpe (22) later added a general theory of market
equilibrium to Markowitz's model. He suggested that risk
includes both market-related and business-related components.
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Market risk is related to the covariance of an investment
with the entire securities market. Business risk refers to
internal risks such as management, leverage and production
delays. Sharpe concurred with Markowitz by stating that
business related risk can be diversified away. However, he
added that market related risk still remains, and is the only
component compensated for in the return on an investment. To
measure the covariance of an individual investment's return
with the entire market, the "beta" was created as a measure
of relative risk.
As emphasized previously, institutional investors have been
actively utilizing sophisticated MPT techniques in their
securities portfolios for years. It has been noted in recent
literature that reliance on these methods is primarily a
function of portfolio size. The largest investors have
realized that critical "big picture" decisions are more
likely to determine the success or failure of a portfolio
than scoring with a few good investments (6).
Investments dependent on the same portion of the economy may
have returns that respond similarly. If a portfolio contains
various investments with highly correlated returns, a shock
to the economy such as a recession could depress the returns
and value of plan assets. A severe recession could affect
the ability of this plan to meet scheduled benefit payments.
It is unlikely that one poorly performing asset would have
such a negative impact on a portfolio. Thus, the allocation
decision between sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture
and banking will be more important to a portfolio than
finding one lucrative stock investment.
Various papers have been written about two categories of real
estate diversification. These include discussions about the
potential impact of real estate on a portfolio and about
diversification opportunities within real estate (12).
Although there has been no resolution to a variety of
questions raised, the potential for benefits using the
principles of MPT has been rationally presented. The
potential benefits of implementing these techniques to real
estate are similar to those already realized by applying the
principles of MPT to stock and bond investments. In
securities investment, sector decisions are more important to
a plan than individual stock selections. Likewise, the
allocation decisions across property type, location or other
units of diversification are more important to real estate
strategy than finding one undervalued property.
BARRIERS TO APPLICATION OF MPT TO REAL ESTATE
Many practitioners have pointed out that it is useless to
attempt to apply MPT based techniques to real estate because
of its many differences from other investment vehicles.
While the debates concerning the effectiveness of MPT have
yet to be resolved, there are various qualities unique to the
real estate industry that serve as barriers to its effective
implementation.
Although the businesses that underly securities may be
heterogeneous, the securities themselves provide the same
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basic product and are highly substitutable; typically,
securities are reducible to variables of expected return and
risk, making comparison among them relatively easy (14).
Real estate, by contrast, is a highly diverse and
individualistic market. Nonmonetary dimensions such as taste
and preference for one architectural style over another can
influence the value of a building.
The value of an intangible asset such as a security is
substantially independent of physical attributes (14). On
the contrary, the value of a tangible asset such as real
estate is highly dependent on these attributes. Location is
the most important tangible attribute of real estate. If a
security is undervalued, a buyer from either New York or
California would generally have the same likelihood of
capitalizing on the opportunity. The same may not hold true
for the buyer of an undervalued Manhattan office building.
This contrast is magnified by high information and
transaction costs and the management intensiveness of real
estate.
Although real estate is largely heterogeneous, certain
property types may have more homogeneous qualities than
others. The potential for utilizing techniques usually
associated with intangible investments, is greater for these
than for other property types (2). For example, apartment
buildings may have more similarities to one another than do
resort properties. This implies that for certain types of
property, common valuation may be easier and the potential
for assessing risk and determining strategy may be greater.
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When and if data improves and becomes more accessible,
investors in these relatively homogeneous properties may be
able to overcome a primary barrier to implementation of MPT
to real estate.
The owner of a stock can pick up the morning newspaper and
read about yesterday's trades or boot up a personal computer
and see today's activity. The owner or prospective buyer of
real estate does not have this access to information. A lack
of reliable data is one of the most commonly cited barriers
to effective implementation of MPT in real estate. The SEC
imposes public disclosure requirements on buyers, sellers and
brokers of stocks. While many institutional owners of real
estate are beginning to cooperate in the exchange of
information, it is still an extremely proprietary business
where the use of inside information is both socially and
legally sanctioned (24). The data that is available is
discussed below.
As opposed to the securities market in which the sole concern
often is identifying appropriate allocation strategies, real
estate enables investors to add value through effective
management of properties. Since real estate is a combination
of tangible and managed assets, it is difficult to
differentiate the marginal diversification benefits related
to management, from those related to asset contribution.
This serves as an additional barrier in that successful
diversification becomes a function of who is managing the
property and their effectiveness at doing so. This implies
that in addition to having the correct "top down" strategy,
management must have expertise at a transaction level. For
this reason, some large plans have instituted strategies that
allocate funds among a variety of managers in order to gain
diversification by judgement and management style, as well as
by sector (10).
Trading of real estate is very thin compared to the
continuous auction market for stocks. Real estate investment
opportunities are not always readily available. The
investment tenure of a real estate investment is usually
longer than that of a securities investment. Also, the due
diligence and legal transfers involved with the purchase and
sale of real estate can take anywhere from two months to more
than a year.
Closely related to this thin market are the high transaction
and search costs required to purchase equity real estate
directly. Every real estate transaction is distinct in
nature. Two adjacent buildings with similar appearances will
hold different "bundles of rights." Each property has unique
qualities that will require review by legal counsel,
engineers (structural, environmental, etc.), financial
advisors and other professionals. Pension plans' fiduciary
duties to their participants increase the need for a thorough
and diligent review of all of these matters for the purpose
of minimizing exposure to large financial losses.
The dollar investment of a typical real estate transaction is
large compared to that of most financial vehicles. It is
not usually possible to purchase just "part of a building."
All of these factors contribute to the very illiquid nature
of real estate, which makes strategies that involve
constantly changing allocations impractical. Open-end real
estate funds, securitized transactions and REITs offer
opportunities for institutions that want to include real
estate in their portfolios in a form similar to securities.
However, each of these vehicles has unique characteristics
that cause them to provide a different set of risk and return
qualities than a traditional equity real estate investment.
Some of these qualities are discussed under the heading,
Asset Characteristics, in Chapter Three.
The barriers to effective implementation of MPT to real
estate may initially seem insurmountable. The nuances
specific to real estate will prevent MPT from ever being
utilized in the same manner that it is in securities
investment; however, recent studies have indicated that
hybrid versions of MPT-based strategies, recognizing these
nuances, may be possible to implement. With pension real
estate holdings already close to $95 billion, the continued
pursuit of effective diversification strategies is certainly
worthwhile.
The following list summarizes the barriers to implementation:
- Heterogeneous nature of real estate
- Lack of reliable data
- Importance of management of real estate assets
- Thin trading; lack of continuous auction market
- High transaction costs
- High search / information costs
- Lack of divisibility / large unit sizes of investment
vehicles
- Illiquid nature of real estate
DATA CURRENTLY IN USE
The ability of a plan to implement a particular strategy will
be limited by the accuracy of the data used to measure and
compare risk and return. Industry data has improved
dramatically over the last ten years. It is somewhat
limited, however, in that the best data currently available
is only from the last twelve years. Early in that period of
time, real estate values appreciated significantly.
Therefore, many simulations have determined that an efficient
portfolio would include real estate allocations accounting
for 10 to 75% of a portfolio. However, considerable
appreciation has occurred in the stock market over the last
several years, while the returns in many real estate
portfolios have been waning. This highlights one of the
problems of using limited historical data and indicates that
future models may not achieve results that are so
aggressively slanted towards real estate allocations.
The reliability of the real estate data that exists is
discussed in nearly every scholarly work written about MPT.
In-house and independent appraisals are the mechanisms used
to measure property values in most data sources. Questions
concerning the lack of industry standards in these appraisals
and the potential for smoothing bias are consistently raised
(9). Smoothing biases are said to occur because appraisals
may move more slowly than true market values of real estate.
Real estate returns are generally perceived to be less
volatile than stock returns; however, the returns are
believed to be more volatile than those indicated by
appraisals. While some proponents of the available data
assert that a averaging of any bias will occur over time
(8), the limited time period for which information is
available inhibits measurement of this assertion.
While the largest fiduciaries in the country, such as
Prudential and Equitable, have voluminous amounts of
proprietary data that can be -internally generated and
observed, most plan sponsors do not have this luxury. These
investors must rely upon national market indices that are
available or attempt to independently gather data on
individual micro-markets. While any of the data gathered may
be limited in accuracy, the fiduciary duties of plan sponsors
will require that they endeavor in the same manner as other
prudent experts to effectively utilize the best information
available.
The Russell-NCREIF index (previously Frank Russell Company
Index) (17) is the industry standard among major
institutional investors. It started with 234 properties in
1977 and as of 1989 included 1222 properties valued at $15.9
billion. The index contains performance data on unleveraged
properties including apartments, office buildings, retail
properties, research and development / office facilities and
warehouses. It is also segmented by four geographic regions
and eight regional divisions. Returns in the index are
broken down by appreciation and property type.
Various papers have created Russell-NCREIF cap-adjusted
indices to attempt to correct for the slow rate of reaction
of appraisal-generated returns (6). To adjust for
sluggishness, the appreciation components of returns are
estimated by treating changes in the current net operating
income of properties as indications of changes in market
values. As expected, these adjustments increase the standard
deviation of returns over those calculated from unadjusted
Russell-NCREIF values.
Equity REIT returns have also been tracked in several
indices. However, various studies have concluded that
returns of equity REITs are more closely correlated with
stock market returns than with other forms of equity real
estate ownership (21). Investors in REITs can benefit from
the use of these and broader securities market indices.
Since the values of underlying assets do not appear to be
reflected in REIT prices, plan sponsors should consider other
data for observing returns on equity real estate.
DIVERSIFICATION POSSIBILITIES DISCUSSED IN RECENT LITERATURE
The diversification benefits that may be realized by
combining real estate with other assets in a portfolio,
coupled with a quest for exceptional returns, have drawn many
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pension plans into real estate. Using the limited data that
is available, various studies have asserted that real estate
as an asset class has an extremely low or even negative
correlation with stock and bond returns. They have also
pointed to the potential benefits of diversifying among
various categories within real estate.
Diversification by geographic area may be the most intuitive
of the diversification categories considered by researchers.
Developers and investors have for years mastered the nuances
of a specific property type and then, either looking for
diversification benefits or additional market opportunities,
moved into new cities and states. However, the actual
analysis of covariance among the returns of different
geographic areas did not take place until several papers
concerning this issue were published in the mid-1980s. The
majority of these analyses used the Russell-NCREIF data, and
divided the nation into four geographic regions: the East,
Midwest, South and West. While the exact results of these
studies have varied with methodology, most concluded that
real estate is negatively correlated to stock and bond
returns and that it has a strong positive correlation to
inflation (6) (12).
The authors note that these categories and the simple
property type categories in use might not produce results
that are in line with the high costs associated with
diversifying across such broad categories. Furthermore, the
Russell-NCREIF data is slanted towards office and larger size
properties, ignores most investments in smaller metropolitan
areas and is based on both in-house and outside appraisals.
The goal of later studies was to take the broad heterogeneous
categories for diversification being used by investment
managers and break then down into distinct, homogeneous
categories that facilitate examination and diversification
across categories (12). These studies utilized different
data sources and examined the performance of assets using
categories of geographic location, property type, property
size, SMSA growth rate and lease maturity. The studies
concluded that all of these categories showed promise and
emphasized the need for investment managers to abandon the
"naive" forms of diversification represented by current
industry practice. They also implied that the allocation
level to real estate by pension funds should increase above
the 4 to 5% present level. Subsequent studies, which
increased the risk of real estate using Russell-NCREIF data
adjusted by both cap rate and appraisal, still concluded that
real estate should represent in excess of 10% of a
portfolio's assets.
Recent studies discuss the need for changing the four basic
geographic regions for diversification presented in earlier
studies. Hartzell, Shulman and Wurtzebach (13) divide the
country into eight regions based on similar underlying
economic characteristics. This study produced correlation
coefficients below the traditional four region model by
diversifying across regional boundaries. This indicates that
diversifying by location is a viable allocation option and
that the regions of the traditional model can be further
refined to increase the potential for identifying investments
with negative correlations.
Various large institutional investors and advisory firms are
actively examining methods for segmenting markets by
location, economic area, lease duration and property type.
The most extreme cases involve clustering cities, independent
of location, that bear similar economic characteristics.
Susan Hudson-Wilson of Aldrich, Eastman and Waltch is
identifying properties that can be substituted for one
another in a plan portfolio by studying property types within
cities with returns that are correlated over time (15).
Some real estate practitioners have voiced concerns as to
whether MPT can be applied to real estate on a practical
basis. Many of these concerns as they relate to strict
adherence to MPT principles are valid. Major firms may have
resources to acquire all of the properties in the "efficient
frontier" and be able to generate reasonable market data
internally from their own immense holdings. The average size
pension plan will be limited by their individual learning
curves and the capabilities and willingness of management to
constantly pursue new territory. The expense associated with
performing due diligence and market research in a multitude
of cities may inhibit pragmatic application of current MPT
tools for all but the largest plans. The models that cluster
cities of economic similarity, which may be separated by
hundreds or thousands of miles, may be particularly cost
inefficient, unless the results can be used to reduce search
and management costs.
Pure MPT application would involve reallocation of assets as
the efficient frontier shifts over time. The transaction
costs of real estate will not allow this fine tuning to
continually occur; at best, longer term targets would need to
be set. Competitive conditions would also prevent certain
purchases or sales from occurring that are favored by the
move toward efficiency.
Many plans also have portfolios with existing equity real
estate investments. Realistically, transaction costs and
market conditions will prohibit major changes to these
portfolios from occurring in short time periods. Long term
strategy will need to be implemented that will provide for
the practical realignment of these investments.
Perhaps the primary obstacle to pension plans' move toward
MPT will be the existing method of plan real estate
investment that has evolved over time. If funds are too
small to make direct investments, they rely on advisors or
consultants to locate real estate investment opportunities.
Often, plans merely perform "naive diversification" among
fund managers, seeking to diversify by judgement and style.
Considering that it is still possible to gain a competitive
advantage in real estate markets or product types, this
approach may be credible. However, unless the inventory of
properties with the advisory firms is consistently assessed,
plans may end up with returns that are highly correlated with
the balance of their other real estate investments and
existing portfolio.
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Ultimately, the fund's ability to implement strategy will
largely be a function of plan size and other related factors
of influence. These issues are discussed in detail in
Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER III: Factors of Influence
Certain factors will influence the investment strategy and
"appropriate level of technology" for a pension plan's real
estate diversification strategy. Although several of these
factors may seem to overlap, it will be more effective to
observe their impact by focusing on them individually.
The diversification strategy for pension plans will be
influenced by the factors illustrated on Exhibit 2. Plan
sponsors must formulate strategies that consider portfolio
objectives, management characteristics, the type of plan
(defined benefit or defined contribution), the size of the
real estate allocation and various asset characteristics.
These factors are "strategic decision points" and will
directly impact the plan's strategy, as shown in the inner
ring on Exhibit 2.
These decision points and, ultimately, the investment
strategy for a plan operate in a "decision making
environment" represented by the outer ring on Exhibit 2.
This environment includes the plan objectives, plan size, the
political and social environment, and regulatory oversight.
Although the analysis of this environment may be largely
qualitative, the outcome can limit the ability of a plan to
create an efficient portfolio.
Exhibit 2
FACTORS INFLUENCING PENSION PLAN
REAL ESTATE STRATEGY
Strategic decision points
Decision making environment
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A. STRATEGIC DECISION POINTS
TYPE OF PLAN
The type of plan that is being utilized will greatly impact
the ultimate strategy chosen. Defined benefit and defined
contribution plans represent the two major types of pension
plans.
Defined benefit plans are the most common plans. The
majority of large public or corporate plans have this type of
structure. According to a recent study by Pensions &
Investments, as of October 1989, defined benefit plans
represented approximately 81% or $1.2 trillion of the assets
of the 200 largest plans in the U.S. (18). This type of
plan guarantees a specific benefit to participants that is
independent of the value of the plan's assets. The
participant's employer typically is responsible for funding
the plan with contributions that must cover the guaranteed
benefits. The level of assets needed in the fund is
estimated using actuarial projections of factors such as wage
and salary growth, employee turnover, vesting probabilities,
and participant mortality (11). The Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC), which was created to administer the
benefit guarantee program of ERISA, serves as a a last resort
to the unpaid participants of defined benefit plans.
Although the defined benefit plan favors the plan
participants, the plan sponsor can be "rewarded" if the
investment performance of plan assets is particularly good.
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If returns are higher than originally anticipated, regular
contributions may be reduced or forgone for certain periods
of time; surplus assets may also actually revert to the
sponsors upon termination of the plan (1).
However, the perceived abuse of the pension system during the
leveraged buyout / takeover craze of the 1980's has sparked
various proposals for legislation that would limit a
corporation's ability to siphon off surplus assets. A large
number of pension plans were actually closed for the purpose
of capturing these reversion funds, often leaving workers
with fixed annuities as substitutes. In response to public
concerns about these activities, Congress raised the
fund-closing surtax from 10% to 15% in 1988, and the IRS
followed suit by imposing a six-month moratorium on
reversions (19). Pressures have also caused some sponsors to
amend their plans to have surplus assets pass to
participants.
Defined contribution plans are more favorable for pension
plan sponsors than are defined benefit plans. They include
employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and profit-sharing
plans. The sole obligation of the employer of a defined
contribution plan participant is to make regular
contributions into the plan. The obligation in this type of
plan is never over or under-funded and the sponsor always
knows what its liability is. Contributions are usually
predicated on either the company's profitability, or on a
particular percentage of the participant's salary.
Participants' ultimate retirement benefits are a function of
the level of contribution and investment performance. The
PBGC does not cover defined contribution plans and thus,
government reporting requirements are much less than for
defined benefit plans.
Specific to defined contribution plans is participant
directed investment. Employers will attempt to satisfy the
investment needs of participants by providing a sufficient
number of vehicles for individual investment. These vehicles
usually take the form of guaranteed investment contracts,
stock and bond pools, and balanced funds. As there are fewer
restrictions on where plan assets may be invested, a large
portion of defined contribution assets are often invested in
company stock. As of October 1989, company stock actually
represented in excess of 23% of total assets of the 1000
largest defined contribution plans (18). Defined
contribution plans are generally thought of as more
conservative investors than defined benefit plans. It is
interesting to note that these conservative investors are
willing to depend on their employers for both their current
income and, by investing heavily in company stock, their
retirement income.
Real estate is a well matched investment for defined benefit
funds. The long-term and stable payroll deductions from
beneficiaries puts them in a strong position to provide
capital and purchase real estate, even during times of high
interest rates. Defined benefit plans have historically been
bigger investors in real estate than defined contribution
plans. In addition to being larger on an absolute basis than
defined contribution plans, defined benefit plans also have a
higher percentage allocation to real estate. In 1989, the
200 largest defined benefit plans had 3.7% of their assets in
real estate, compared to only 1.4% for defined contribution
plans (18). Several factors may explain this phenomena. The
participant directed investment programs seen in most defined
contribution plans are not well-suited for the retention of
large fixed investments such as real estate. Employers
typically offer choices to participants in the form of funds
which include stock or fixed income securities; equity real
estate investments are often not included among this menu.
It is generally perceived that since the retirement benefits
of defined contribution plans are directly linked to the
performance of investments, with no employer or government
guarantees, more conservative investment programs must be
created (16). Real estate remains foreign as an investment
vehicle to most plans; it is still seen as a more risky
proposition than securities or debt instruments. This is
ironic in that most pension investments in real estate have,
unlike the underlying structure of their stock holdings,
involved little or no leverage. Additionally, most
properties have been prime buildings with stabilized
occupancies.
The role of MPT as applied to an entire investment portfolio
will not be as relevant to defined contribution as to defined
benefit plans. With the participant directed investment,
plan sponsors do not have control of the asset mix of each
individual portfolio. Since the sponsor's obligation ends
after it has made its contribution to a participant's plan,
there is no chance for unfunded liabilities as there is in
defined benefit plans; other than from a moral standpoint,
there will be no rewards for stellar returns.
Although the motivations are different for defined
contribution plans, employers still have fiduciary duties to
the participants. Various lawsuits occurred during the
1970's involving profit-sharing plans that had invested too
heavily in company stock; the charge usually was made that
the plan sponsor should have diversified the portfolio and
reduced the chance that retirement benefits could be
drastically cut (16). Diversification among real estate
investments would minimize the opportunity for employees to
successfully argue that a plan sponsor did not act in the
best interest of the participants.
SIZE OF REAL ESTATE ALLOCATION
As a plan's allocation to real estate increases, there will
be economies of scale related to certain costs that are
independent of transaction size. These economies will have a
large influence on investment strategy. Assume that it is
decided that performing asset allocation in-house would be
worthwhile, compensated by either savings or extra-returns.
The marginal increases to this operation necessary to take on
additional properties would be rather small compared to the
added asset values of property. For example, if it takes a
staff of eight to handle $100 million worth of property, it
may reasonably take only a staff of ten to handle $200
million. The same economies would hold true for the costs of
assembling data bases and determining the optimal strategy.
Similar economies would not exist for a plan if the $100
million allocation was split among advisors or invested in a
large commingled fund.
Up to this point, the assumption has been made that
allocations to real estate would require "within real estate"
diversification. However, real estate may also be a small
enough targeted investment relative to the size of the
portfolio that it could be interpreted as an alternative
investment to primary asset class investments such as stocks
and bonds. The consequences of making a $10 million real
estate investment that represented 1% of a portfolio would
merit different strategy from the same dollar investment
representing 10% of a portfolio. Unfortunately, this
distinction, like many interpretations of what is "prudent"
fiduciary behavior for plan sponsors, is extremely
subjective. This issue is covered in greater detail in
Chapter Four.
The size of the allocation relative to the unit size of the
investment vehicle will be an important determinant of a
plan's ability to exercise a particular strategy. In
general, more divisible investments will be available to a
greater number of plans. At one extreme, REITs will be
investment opportunities for plans with enough capital to buy
one share of stock. Looking at Russell-NCREIF average
property values, retail shopping centers will only be
available as investments to plans with at least $25 million
in capital. This matter is discussed in greater detail in
Chapter Four.
PORTFOLIO OBJECTIVES
Identifying the appropriate strategy for a particular plan is
inextricably tied to the objectives of the portfolio. It
will be critical to identify the objective of the entire
portfolio and the role that real estate is expected to play.
Analysis of this matter will primarily revolve around the
plan's mandate of paying benefits upon the retirement of
employees. To understand these objectives, it will be useful
to consider cash flow and liquidity requirements, inflation
and tax issues, desired investment tenure and risk and return
profiles.
RISK AND RETURN
The overall risk and return targets of a plan portfolio will
weigh heavily on the strategy for real estate investment. A
prudent strategy will search for the highest possible
return for a given level of risk. However, the plan should
be explicit in its expectations for both of these areas; it
should also be explicit in the time frames over which it is
expecting such performance. As discussed in Chapter 2, real
estate involves a unique set of problems associated with risk
and return analyses. Still, to even attempt to look at real
estate in a portfolio context, the plan sponsor must be able
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to consider the projected incremental impact of any
individual asset purchase or sale.
An important consideration of risk and return in a plan
portfolio will be the context in which it is analyzed; it may
not be appropriate to assess risk relative to other plans or
in absolute terms. Since the ultimate purpose is to provide
benefits to participants, balancing plan liabilities, cash
flow and financial characteristics of the employer should be
of primary concern (1).
The cost of various strategies should always be weighed
against projected benefits. For example, the associated
costs of creating an in-house staff should be compensated by
additional returns. Likewise, the decision to use an
external manager should be analyzed on the basis of
performance versus fees. To attempt to look at various
strategies on a realistic basis, the probability of receiving
returns under different scenarios must be considered. This
analysis may take the form of estimations based on both past
performance and informed opinions as to future performance.
CASH FLOWS / LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS / TENURE
The current funding level of a plan should mold the
objectives of the portfolio and ultimately impact the
investment strategy. A plan with a small unfunded liability
would justify a more aggressive strategy than one that must
avoid losses to make up for a sizeable unfunded liability or
for previous losses (16).
Plan sponsors will also need to project into the future to
guarantee that liquid sources of funds will be available to
make required benefit payments to participants. Prudent
policy would dictate that asset decisions be made on the
basis of scheduled benefits. This may vary depending on the
profile of participants. An older, shrinking work force may
create a scenario where benefits being paid out exceed
contributions, reflecting the need for a somewhat cautious
strategy. A young, growing work force may create an opposite
situation, with positive net contributions, and represent an
opportunity for a more aggressive strategy (1).
The liquidity and cash flow needs of a plan will ultimately
be a function of how far liquidity goals are projected into
the future. These projections help plans to avoid making
benefit payments from the untimely sale of assets with
depressed price levels. The farther that a plan projects
into the future, the greater its liquidity needs will be.
Consequently, the overall asset mix for a given portfolio may
also need to be changed to meet a targeted risk/return level,
depending on the need to hold cash equivalent assets to meet
payments.
Real estate investment will possibly represent the least
liquid portion of a plan's assets. Since it will typically
represent less than 10% of a plan's assets, this should not
burden even those funds with negative net contributions and
large liquidity needs. Even if liquidity is such a concern
that it actually would prohibit investment by direct
purchases, separate accounts or closed-end funds, real estate
can still be a viable option. Vehicles such as open-end
funds or REITs still offer many of the benefits experienced
in the more illiquid forms of real estate investment.
The breakdown between income and appreciation components of
real estate returns must be considered when looking at
liquidity and funding needs. Properties with a high current
cash flow and modest appreciation components may be
well-suited for plans with immediate needs for benefit
payments; the opposite may hold true for plans with needs
projected further into the future.
INFLATIONARY HEDGE
Pension plans began to look seriously at real estate in the
1970s, during which time the stock market was in a lull and
fixed income instruments lost considerable purchasing power.
Growth in rental income and the appreciation component of
real estate offered the plans better protection against
inflation (5). Various studies have concurred with this,
indicating that returns on real estate investments are highly
correlated with inflation.
The portfolio objectives for plans will vary depending on
their goals regarding inflation's impact on assets. It is
not enough to assume that a firm will acquire assets that act
as hedges against inflation. It will also be necessary to
look at the firm's business revenue and its relationship to
inflation. If a firm's wages increase in response to
inflation while its plan asset values decrease, it may need
to supplement payments to the plan during a time that cash is
tight. Understanding this relationship will help a sponsor
to plan accordingly and avoid unanticipated cash shortfalls.
Among property types, investors will also find varying levels
of inflationary hedges. Studies have indicated that
properties with income based on a tenant's sale of goods and
services may provide better protection against inflation than
those whose rents are not tied directly to sales. Leases
tied to tenant sales, as are most retail leases, and those
with "pass-through" expense clauses also have provided better
inflation protection.
TAX CONSIDERATIONS
In creating investment strategies in line with portfolio
objectives, tax issues specific to pension plans must be
considered; these issues will impact purchase and sale,
financing and lease structures. All pension plans come under
the jurisdiction of the Internal Revenue Service and must
follow strict guidelines to maintain their beneficial
tax-exempt status. They must be diligent in their annual
reporting of information such as plan assets, liabilities,
receipts, disbursements, and unfunded liabilities.
Plans that decide to use leverage in their portfolios may be
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subject to taxes on unrelated business income tax (UBIT).
While it is not within the scope of this paper to broach this
topic in depth, suffice to say that a plan may be subject to
tax on the share of profit that is equal to the percentage of
leverage used in acquisition. For example, if 75% of the
purchase price is financed, 75% of the profit may be subject
to UBIT. Leverage will not be appropriate for all plans;
however, if the returns to a plan on a risk-adjusted basis
are greater even after paying the tax related to leverage,
the use of leverage could serve in the interest of plan
participants.
Leases and purchase contracts must be structured with the
nuances of pension plan tax issues in mind. Different rules
will apply for public and private plans. For private plans,
rental payments that are based on a percentage of the
tenant's net profits are taxable. This will certainly
affect the return and strategy for investing in retail
properties, which commonly use this type of lease. Tax
obligations may also arise if the property is subject to debt
that is associated with sale-leaseback transactions,
below-market financing or related party loans.
MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS
As mentioned in Chapter 2, real estate is a combination of
tangible and managed assets. Thus, real estate management
is a critical function that will ultimately affect the
investor's return and risk exposure.
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A primary influence on a plan's strategy is the ability of
the sponsor to assume the management intensive
responsibilities inherent in real estate investment. If they
are not confident that they can perform in the capacity of a
prudent expert, a financial instrument must be chosen that
that will relieve the plan sponsor of these functions. A
steep "learning curve" with regard to real estate may compel
a plan to use certain investment vehicles as a training
ground to prepare it for more management intensive
investments.
By selecting certain instruments, the sponsor will be
relinquishing control of which assets are selected and of the
ability to select the portfolio that reflects the most
efficient alternative. While asset allocation decisions may
be controlled in separate account and direct investment
forms, REITs and CREFs will typically not offer this same
opportunity.
If cost was the only consideration in the decision of hiring
external managers versus bringing management in-house, many
more plans would have internal stock, bond and real estate
managers. Many plans are satisfied that plan management is
"not their business" or feel that external managers offer a
greater potential for returns. The multiple selection of
managers within each class also indicates that funds are
looking to diversify by style and judgement.
The question of operating costs is high on the agenda of many
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pension fund executives, with a push currently underway to
improve bottom line profits through reductions in management
costs (1). As plans tend to move with a herd mentality, many
may create internal operations in the future. As concepts of
MPT develop, the availability of talent with an understanding
of real estate to fill these roles will also increase.
ASSET CHARACTERISTICS
The ability of a plan to implement an investment strategy for
real estate is a function of the characteristics of the
vehicles available for investment. The vehicles under
consideration for this paper will be open and closed-end
funds, separate accounts, direct investments and REITs.
Liquidity and transferability of each of these investment
vehicles is different. REITs offer the most flexibility in
this area with the ease and marketability of any stock
investment; however, REIT returns have been shown to be
highly correlated with securities returns, thus providing
less diversification opportunities than other real estate
investment vehicles.
Open-end funds have a greater degree of liquidity than
closed-end funds and direct investment. By leaving a portion
of funds in cash and securities the fund may be able to buy
out partners who want to liquidate their shares.
Unfortunately open-end funds are similar to banks; if all
partners came to withdraw funds at the same time, funds
available for buy-outs would be quickly drained, requiring
that assets be sold to meet cash needs. Values for
liquidation are determined by appraisals which take place
on a quarterly basis (2).
Separate accounts and direct investment are less liquid forms
of equity real estate investment than REITs and CREFs.
However, market conditions at the time of desired sale will
influence the relative degree of liquidity of any property.
Well leased, "trophy" properties have been extremely saleable
over the last five years because of pent-up demand by
institutional and foreign investors.
Since there is no established secondary market for shares in
closed-end funds, they represent the least liquid form.
Also, when the closed-end funds reach a certain level of
subscription they will "close," limiting the ability of plans
to consider all funds in their universe of prospective
investments. As with separate accounts and direct
investment, the liquidity of closed-end funds will be largely
a function of market conditions present at the time of
desired sale.
It will not be possible to fulfill the same diversification
goals with different investment vehicles. For example, a
plan's investment strategy may be to acquire warehouse
buildings by direct investment in a particular geographic
area. It may be difficult to execute this strategy with a
separate account if there is no advisor with expertise in
that property type and geographic area. Existing open-end or
closed-end funds will even be less likely to fulfill specific
goals that have been set; this will particularly hold true
for narrowly defined asset characteristics. The plan may be
able to identify opportunities within each of these other
vehicles that are similar ; however, the heterogeneous nature
of real estate will prevent the goals from being fulfilled
precisely as desired.
The asset characteristic having the greatest impact on a
particular investment strategy will be the "unit size" of
each vehicle and the related issue of asset divisibility.
REITs offer the greatest flexibility with investment of one
share of a trust possible for any plan. Both closed and
open-end funds are available with unit sizes ranging from "no
minimum" to $100 million; most of the larger advisors have
funds available from $1 to $5 million. The quality of
management and the risk / return characteristics will vary by
advisor.
Direct investment or separate accounts have the greatest unit
size and divisibility constraints. Consider the average
values of properties in the 4th quarter 1989 Russell-NCREIF
index (17). A warehouse building involves the lowest initial
investment of $6.3 million. If a plan wants to invest in
retail centers, the most expensive property in the index, the
value is $25 million. Of course, the values represented in
the index are only average values; many properties in the
portfolio actually have much higher or lower values than
those reflected in the average.
It is unlikely that direct investment or separate account
investment will include properties with values below several
million dollars; properties at the low end of the spectrum
will carry a higher level of risk inconsistent with the
standards of prudence. This will also depend on the role
that a particular property will play in the portfolio. The
largest properties will involve major investments that only
the largest institutional investors or advisors can handle.
These would include super regional malls and CBD high-rises
that can easily exceed $500 million in value.
The unit size constraint will impact the plan's choice of
investment vehicles. If $20 million represents a plan's
entire real estate allocation and comprises 5-10% of their
portfolio, it will be difficult to assert that purchasing one
suburban office building is a prudent decision. The purchase
of several apartment or industrial projects may offer some
level of diversification; however, interviews with asset
managers indicates that the "conventional wisdom" in the
industry requires the purchase of at least ten properties.
B. DECISION MAKING ENVIRONMENT
PLAN OBJECTIVES
Before a real estate strategy can be identified it is
important to consider what the pension plan's objectives are
and why the plan has been established. Pension plans are not
only tools to provide for the retirement of workers. The
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sponsor is usually looking for something in return; the plan
may serve as a tool for attracting the best quality workers
or minimizing employee turnover.
Plan benefits may also serve as a bargaining chip in
negotiating with workers. If workers or unions are demanding
higher wage compensation that a corporation can't presently
afford, additional pension benefits may be offered as a
compromise. Thus, the workers get higher compensation, which
the company can pay out over a much longer period of time
than an immediate increase to wages would entail.
The tax-exempt nature of pension plans offers considerable
opportunity for creative tax planning. If assets with income
subject to a high tax rate are placed in the plan while other
"low tax" assets are retained in a corporate entity, an
overall tax savings should accrue to the sponsor (1). For
instance, if the objective of a plan was largely
tax-motivated, the sponsor might prefer to keep real estate
with a low current cash flow and a high capital appreciation
component on the corporate balance sheet; this same sponsor
might prefer to keep guaranteed investment contracts in the
pension plan. Although a warehouse with a long term tenant
might still fit into this plan portfolio, a speculative
office building might not. In this example, the plan
objective would weigh heavily on the real estate strategy.
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PLAN SIZE
As referred to in Chapter 3, reliance on the MPT techniques
utilized in securities market applications has largely been a
function of plan size. Although many of the large advisory
firms have sufficient equity real estate to achieve the
economy of scale to make the implementation of MPT cost
efficient, relatively few pension plans have this same
luxury. Assuming hypothetically that 10% is a target
allocation for real estate, and that a small portfolio of 10
to 15 "institutional grade" properties could be assembled for
$100-200 million, this would imply that a $1-$2 billion
portfolio is necessary to make this level of investment.
This would include only the top 318 pension plans in America
(18). Thus, in this instance, both the size of the plan and
the targeted level of allocation are tied closely to the
ability of a plan sponsor to make either a direct or separate
account investment.
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
ERISA
Various pieces of legislation passed during the 1900's have
greatly influenced the investment approaches of private
pension plans. This legislation impacted employee coverage,
revocability, administration, investment regulations and
standards. The most pervasive of these laws was the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) which was enacted in
1974. ERISA has been modified several times since 1974, with
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each change increasing the oversight role of the U.S.
Department of Labor.
ERISA was the product of ten years of debate over pension
reform. At a most simplistic level, it was crafted to ensure
that the pension commitments made to employees by
corporations were upheld. It imposed financial
responsibilities on employers by creating strict funding
standards which would increase the probability that benefits
would be received by participants.
To additionally insure that employees receive their benefits,
ERISA established the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation
(PBGC), a guarantee program for defined benefit plans. Their
position as guarantor also gives them an oversight role on
plan investments. The PBGC is funded by assessments on both
single and multi-employer defined benefit plans.
Perhaps of greatest influence on the determination of
appropriate investment strategies for pension plans was
ERISA's creation of standards that are required of plan
sponsors and investment managers in the execution of their
duties. The four general fiduciary duties specified relate
to loyalty, prudence, diversification and conformity to plan
documents and instruments (11).
The duty of loyalty relates to avoiding self-dealing and
conflicts of interest. According to ERISA, the fiduciary
must "discharge his or her duties solely in the interest of
plan participants or beneficiaries, and for the sole purpose
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of providing plan benefits to them." This duty also implies
that plan sponsors must avoid favoring one group of plan
participants over another.
The plan sponsor must act "with the care, skill, prudence and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like
character and like aims." The Labor Department followed up
this language with a 1979 interpretation indicating that the
prudence of individual investments would be judged on the
basis of suitability within the plan's total investment
program. This included consideration of the portfolio's
composition, liquidity and current return relative to
anticipated cash flow requirements, and the projected return
of the portfolio relative to the funding requirements. It
was also explicitly stated in this interpretation that the
"prudent man" standard did not eliminate the opportunity to
invest in risky investments (4).
Various legal commentators have pointed out that although the
prudence standard created in ERISA is similar to the "prudent
man" rule covering trusts, it actually creates a standard of
"prudent expert." They indicate that since a prudent expert
has a greater familiarity with the investment management
problem, he or she will be held to a higher standard of
accountability. Their standards will not just be compared to
the "common man" but against other fiduciaries in like
positions (16).
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ERISA was drafted prior to the time that plan sponsors were
instituting diversification strategies, even for securities,
that were based on MPT. Thus, ERISA does not explicitly state
or create standards for appropriate methods of
diversification. It only specifies "diversifying the
investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent
not to do so." Although the language basically suggests that
a plan should not "put all of its eggs in one basket," it
does seem to imply that some losses can occur without
creating a breach of fiduciary duty.
The fourth fiduciary duty merely requires a plan to follow
the self-imposed written rules that it has created. ERISA
also states that liability for fiduciary misconduct will
extend to both corporate sponsors and individuals.
The ERISA standards impacted diversification strategies and
have been considered for years in the implementation of MPT
principles on other assets in plan portfolios. They impact
both plan sponsors as well as advisors and/or consultants
acting in fiduciary capacities for the plan. Their influence
on real estate strategy has been profound over the last ten
years, but will probably gain in importance as industry data
improves and techniques of diversification based on MPT
become more prevalent.
The "prudent man/expert" standard should receive serious
consideration as the plan sponsor is formulating real estate
investment strategy. It is logical that the standards
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expected of pension plans will increase as more fiduciaries
begin to apply sophisticated top-down approaches to their
real estate investments. A greater understanding of the
nuances of real estate risks, returns, and portfolio
implications will be necessary to achieve the high standards
imposed by the duty of prudence.
Plan sponsors have historically used advisory firms and
pooled investment vehicles to fulfill the prudence standard.
However, these firms often are looking only at specific asset
purchases as opposed to portfolio implications of individual
investments. Although a particular investment pool may
actually achieve some level of diversification, a reduction
in portfolio risk for the plan/investor may or may not occur,
depending on the composition of its existing assets. In
order to effectively identify a prudent strategy, the plan
sponsor must be willing to assume the responsibilities
associated with implementing a strategy or bring in an
unbiased, third party who is able to competently make these
decisions.
Additionally, advisory firms are in the business of selling
the shares of their particular pools or specialty funds; this
interest may be in conflict with identifying the most
appropriate forms of investment for a plan. In many
instances, these firms are simultaneously managing separate
client accounts and general account funds. Difficult
decisions often occur as to which account should benefit from
the acquisition of prime properties. To solve this dilemma,
some of the advisory firms have created subsidiaries to
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maintain distinct identities between funds (2). Others have
instituted simple lottery systems to allocate among various
accounts without bias.
With allocations to real estate approaching nearly 5% of
assets in the major funds, treatment of real estate as the
"venture capital" portion of a portfolio would appear to
conflict with the diversification standard. Holding the
majority of a securities portfolio in one stock would be
considered imprudent because of the lack of diversification;
as real estate gains respect as an asset class, this same
analysis should be applied.
The standards created in ERISA will continue to have a
profound effect on real estate investment for pension plans.
As plan sponsors formulate their investment strategies, they
must recall that the ultimate purpose of a plan is to provide
retirement funds for company or public employees and that
ERISA was created to protect the rights of these employees.
The government bail-out and continuing defaults in the thrift
and banking industries have encouraged increased scrutiny of
the conduct of pension plans. Even with recent increases in
insurance rates paid by the nation's plans, the PGBC has a
negative "net worth" with assets of approximately $2.5
billion against approximately $4 billion in liabilities (19).
The government will certainly want to avoid watching the PBGC
turn into a 1990's version of the FSLIC. Plan sponsor
adherence to the duties created under ERISA will help to
minimize liability and chances for perceived misconduct.
STATE STATUTES & COMMON LAW
State statutes and common law are most often discussed with
reference to public pension plans, as these plans do not fall
under the guidelines of ERISA. The common law standards for
fiduciary conduct and the state statutes governing
administration of public retirement systems are often more
rigid than those of ERISA.
Common law requirements are similar to ERISA with
requirements for prudence, loyalty and restrictions against
conflicts of interest. State statutes, that have replaced
common law standards in many states, regulate plan
investments by limiting investments in certain vehicles,
while requiring certain other types; or requiring adherence
to prudence standards similar to common law; or requiring
some combination of common law and investment guidelines
(11).
Although public plans are not usually as well funded as
private plans, their funding periods are typically longer.
This lower funding level implies that the risk of default on
benefit obligations is perceived to be much lower for public
than for private sponsors (16).
Public pension plans have historically been more conservative
than private plans, typically holding a much lower percentage
of equities in their portfolios. The real estate holdings of
public plans are reasonably close on a percentage basis to
that of private plans. In 1989, the 200 largest public
defined benefit plans held 3.8% of their portfolios in real
estate compared to 4.5% for private plans. This represented
an increase from 1987 of 12% for public plans and a decrease
of 6% for the private plans (18).
The implications of state statutes and common law standards
for public plan real estate investment strategy are similar
to ERISA's impact on private plans. Not only are the future
retirement benefits of participants at stake, the plan's
activities will be viewed in the public eye as "government
activities" creating the need for the highest standards of
prudence and loyalty. This additional level of scrutiny only
offers additional rationale for implementing the most
sophisticated techniques for diversification available.
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INFLUENCES
Certain "non-monetary" investment considerations will impact
the investment strategy of plans. In many instances, these
considerations will not bear any relation to identifying the
efficient frontier for a portfolio. Political and social
influences, which are an area of frequent plan controversy,
are the primary non-monetary considerations.
An example often cited in the influence of social issues on
plans is the sale of securities related to South African
companies. It is simple to project that this divestment
could easily extend to other areas of reasoning such as
environmental consciousness and union activism. Reductions
in federal aid have sparked much of the push for social
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investment by plans.
Different opinions have been formed as to whether social
investing is consistent with the goals of pension plans. The
views tend to vary depending on whether the plan is
affiliated with government, industry or labor. Primary
opponents to this form of investment for plans contend that
it simply amounts to a subsidy for economic, social and
political goals; it is their opinion that these subsidies
should be absorbed by the government and that the primary
purpose of plans is to provide the best possible return on
plan assets. They further state that by sacrificing
financial return for social clauses, plan sponsors are
breaching the duties of loyalty and prudence (11).
Proponents of "nontraditional" investment goals have varied
motivations. While some believe that financial performance
criteria for these investments must be met, others would
prefer to also consider investments that do not meet any such
standards. Some advocates assert that by using plan assets
for investments such as housing and economic development,
funding for plans may actually improve as area economies
grow. At a basic level, most of the supporters feel that
plan assets belong to the participants, who should have the
ability to decide where their funds are invested.
These nonmonetary considerations will impact the ability of a
plan sponsor to implement the most effective strategies for
diversification. Since these social influences will favor
certain geographic areas and investment types, the sponsor
will be limited to a smaller universe of investments. It is
possible that strategy could be limited to attempting to
identify properties with low or negative covariation of
returns within certain cities or states.
Suppose that low income housing with a below-market return is
is socially imposed as a portion of a portfolio. If overall
return objectives for a plan are to remain the same, the
strategy for the balance of the portfolio must change. In
order to meet the targeted objectives, the risk and return
profile of other investments pursued will need to increase.
Thus, the construction of an efficient portfolio may need to
be altered to subsidize social investments in a plan.
LIKELY EVOLUTION OF PENSION PLAN REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT
The factors of influence described will mold the strategy and
evolution of pension plan real estate investment. As
information improves and the results of new allocation
models are analyzed, real estate allocations may rise to 10%
of assets as projected by many industry experts. However,
various factors may prevent this from occurring over the next
five to seven years.
As mentioned previously, allocation models have mostly used
data gathered during a time that real estate returns exceeded
those of most other financial instruments. This caused many
of these models to generate efficient portfolios including
real estate allocations in excess of 10%. However, the
overbuilding that has taken place in most major metropolitan
areas, has caused vacancies to rise and effective rents to
fall. Returns on the real estate in some institutional real
estate portfolios have actually fallen below those on
Treasury bonds over the last several years. This new
information would probably cause many previously calculated
portfolio models to reduce the allocation to real estate.
The present liquidity crisis for new development funds and
the uncertainty caused by the large inventory of Resolution
Trust Corporation properties may continue to darken the image
of real estate for institutions over the next five years.
There is also a shortage of the "institutional quality"
properties that plans traditionally have invested in. In
the mean time, plan assets continue to grow by approximately
$300 billion per year. The combination of new real estate
acquisitions and appreciation of existing properties must
increase by approximately 12% per year just to maintain
current allocation levels. With the current state of the
real estate market and lack of available product, it is
difficult to imagine that allocations will exceed current
levels in the near term.
Studies underway at a number of the nation's major
institutions and advisory firms should shed additional light
on potential applications of MPT to real estate. As these
methods are refined and real estate can be properly analyzed
with primary asset investments such as stocks and bonds,
pension plans should give additional consideration to real
estate allocations. However, it is unlikely that most plans
will implement these techniques. As in securities
investment, mainly the largest plans will be willing to spend
the time and upfront resources necessary to bring MPT to real
estate analyses.
Plans have been under scrutiny to control their costs of
operation. As they attempt to minimize expenses and search
for higher returns, many larger plans may begin to bring
management and allocation functions in-house. New
employment opportunities will exist for professionals looking
to manage portfolios in institutional settings.
Additionally, pressure to reduce fees will be created as
plans begin to bring operations in-house and additional
competition enters the advisory and consulting businesses.
This may create a scenario where these operations become
dependent on volume as margins are reduced for both advisors
and consultants. As in the financial services industry, only
the largest firms and those with specialized niches may
survive this potential shakeout.
The potential for sizeable increases to real estate
allocations creates a system that will reward those able to
create vehicles attracting the attention of both defined
benefit and defined contribution plans. The barriers to the
application of MPT to real estate described in Chapter Two
will encourage additional innovation in the securitization of
real estate. The properties best suited for this
securitization may be those properties with many homogeneous
qualities, such as apartment buildings. Furthermore, the
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large potential market represented by defined contribution
plans will encourage the innovation of vehicles and methods
that will overcome the problems associated with these
employee-directed plans.
CHAPTER IV: Methodology & Proposed Framework
The purpose of this chapter is to create a general framework
that a pension plan sponsor can utilize to determine
pragmatic allocation strategies. MPT and its application to
real estate are still in a state of flux, making it
impossible to utilize complex quantitative techniques to
determine strategy that will apply for each plan. As
illustrated in Chapter Three, there are a variety of factors
that may either enhance or inhibit the ability of a plan to
implement a particular strategy.
This chapter extracts common- elements from the factors of
influence and illustrates different potential strategies for
plans against a general framework of industry averages and
conventional wisdom from the real estate industry. The
primary consideration is the impact of plan size, level of
real estate allocation, and asset characteristics on the
diversification strategy. Many of the factors of influence
are qualitative in nature and are difficult to consider
simultaneously. Thus, a plan sponsor must examine these
qualitative constraints in concert with the tangible
constraints that will be considered.
As the percentage allocation to real estate becomes
significant enough for sponsors to be concerned about the
risk of large losses cited in ERISA and many state statutes,
diversification within real estate should occur. However, it
is realistic to assume that at certain low levels of
allocation, diversification may not be a concern. Exhibit 3,
which shows potential allocations as a function of plan size,
reflects this rationale. The Alternative Asset Class
category, which includes allocations from 1-2% of the
portfolio, is presumed to include investment vehicles that
carry a higher risk and return than the the primary asset
classes in the portfolio.
The view of real estate has shifted in the past ten years
from just one of many investment alternatives to a more
significant asset class. Real estate was previously
categorized with high risk alternatives such as venture
capital investments, instead of with primary asset classes
such as stocks and bonds. The increasing allocation of real
estate in plan portfolios is changing this perception.
Indeed, at 5-10% of the portfolio, real estate should be
considered in the same manner as other primary asset classes;
a Primary Asset Class category of this size requires that
within real estate diversification be pursued.
Plan decisions on allocation strategies are subjective in
nature and will vary since ERISA does not establish strict
standards for diversification or the measurement of risk.
Each plan will have different perceptions as to what level of
allocation constitutes both Primary Asset Class and
Alternative Asset Class categories. Thus, percentages for
either category can be adjusted to more closely reflect the
strategies of individual plans.
Merely looking at these categories without consideration of
REAL ESTATE ALLOCATION & A FEUNCTION QZ PLA SIZE
PLAN SIZE P&I
(000,000) RANK *
ALTERNATIVE
ASSET CLASS
ALLOCATION
1% 2%
PRIMARY
ASSET CLASS
ALLOCATION
5% 10%
$50
$100
$200
$500
$1,000
$2,000
$5,000
$10,000
$20,000
N/A
N/A
946
533
318
162
73
34
$0.5
$1
$2
$5
$10
$20
$50
$100
$200
$1
$2
$4
$10
$20
$40
$100
$200
$400 $1,000 $2,000
* RANKINGS FROM PENSION AND INVESTMENTS 1-22-90.
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$2.5
$5
$10
$25
$50
$100
$250
$500
$5
$10
$20
$50
$100
$200
$500
$1,000
the dollars involved would also not be prudent. For
instance, 1% of a $2 billion plan amounts to $200 million; it
may not please participants to see a sum of this size
invested without any attempt to diversify.
Real estate will increase in importance to all pension plans
as more securitized vehicles become available and are proven
to be prudent investments. Until this occurs, plan
allocations to real estate will mostly be limited to the
largest 1000 plans in America (18). These plans represent
aprroximately 70% of the total U.S. pension assets. In turn,
approximately 76% of the assets of the top 1000 plans, or
$1.435 trillion are in the top 200 plans in America. They
hold about 90% of U.S. pension real estate assets. These
large plans have the greatest flexibility and opportunities
for implementing different diversification strategies.
Various studies of MPT have shown "efficient portfolios" of
properties, showing percentage allocations to various
property types, geographic areas, economic areas and other
units of diversification. However, if the investment vehicle
lacks divisibility, whether it is a shopping center, office
building, or share in a commingled fund, the efficient
frontier may be unobtainable for certain levels of
allocation. This is not to belittle these studies of
efficient portfolios which are shedding new light on the
correlations and returns of properties; on the contrary, the
purpose of these observations is to observe what plans might
have to do in order to best utilize this new information.
Exhibit 4 and 5 calculate the portfolios that can be created
under different allocation levels assuming average property
values from the 4th quarter 1989 Russell-NCREIF index
portfolio. These benchmarks are then used to analyze direct
investment and separate account possibilities. Although
these numbers are worth observing for the purposes of this
particular analysis, they are average values that might not
apply to each portfolio. Individual properties, of course,
will have a wider range of acquisition costs.
The number of properties that should be purchased by a plan
to achieve a certain level of diversification is unknown.
Even at the nation's top advisory firms, this decision is
more intuitive than quantitative. Although real estate firms
are beginning to speak of things such as "core portfolios"
there is not a parallel to the securities market's
value-weighted index portfolio.
Theoretically, two properties with a covariance of -1 could
create a portfolio with perfect within real estate
diversification. However, from a practical standpoint this
is unlikely to occur and the plan sponsor would be too
concerned about perceived mismanagement of funds to institute
such a strategy. Thus, using an "intuitive sense" approach,
we will assume that the Alternative Asset Class group is
unconcerned with the number of properties purchased, and that
the Primary Asset Class requires a minimum of ten properties.
Interviews with asset managers indicates that ten properties
represent an approximation of the number of these needed to
yield a suitable comfort level for many CREF managers.
EZXBIT I
SINGLE PROPERTY TYX" PORTFOLO BASED QE RUSSELL-NCREIF
INDEZ AVERAGE VALUZE (4Z QUARTER 1989) *
R.E. ALLOCATION
(000,000)
# OF PROPERTIES IN SINGLE PROPERTY TYPE PORTFOLIOS
(BASED ON AVERAGE PROPERTY VALUES)
OFFICE RETAIL
$0.5
$1
$2.5
$5
$10
$20
$25
$50
$100
$200
$250
$500
$1,000
$2,000
0.03
0.05
0.13
0.25
0.51
1.02
1.27
2.54
5.08
10.15
12.69
25.38
50.76
101.52
0.02
0.04
0.10
0.20
0.40
0.80
1.00
2.00
4.00
8.00
10.00
20.00
40.00
80.00
WARE
0.08
0.16
0.40
0.79
1.59
3.17
3.97
7.94
15.87
31.75
39.68
79.37
158.73
317.46
R&D
0.06
0.12
0.31
0.62
1.23
2.47
3.09
6.17
12.35
24.69
30.86
61.73
123.46
246.91
APT
0.04
0.08
0.19
0.38
0.76
1.52
1.89
3.79
7.58
15.15
18.94
37.88
75.76
151.52
THRESHOLD ALLOCATIONS FOR ALTERNATIVE & PRIMARY ASSET CLASSES (000,000)
OFFICE RETAIL
ALTERNATIVE ASSET (1 PROP)
PRIMARY ASSET (10 PROPS)
$20
$200
$25
$250
WARE
$10
$100
R&D
$10
$100
APT
$20
$200
RUSSELL-NCREIF INDEX AVERAGE PROPERTY VALUES (000,000) **
Office
Retail
Warehouse
R&D / Office
Apartment
$19.7
$25.0
$6.3
$8.1
$13.2
* THE "OTHER" PROPERTY TYPE ACCOUNTING FOR 2% OF INDEX HAS BEEN EXCLUDED.
** TOTAL VALUE BY PROPERTY TYPE / # OF PROPERTIES IN INDEX PORTFOLIO.
EXHIBIT I
VALUE WEIGHTED PORTFOLIOS ALLOCATED QN BASIS QZ RUSSELL-NCREIF INDEZ
AVERAGE VALUES I DISTRIBUTION (4TU QUARTZR 198) *
R.E. ALLOCATION
(000,000)
$0.5
$1
$2.5
$5
$10
$20
$25
$50
$100
$200
$250
$500
$1,000
$2,000
#OF PROPERTIES
(BASED ON
OFFICE RETAIL
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.10
0.21
0.41
0.52
1.03
2.06
4.12
5.15
10.31
20.62
41.23
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.09
0.18
0.23
0.46
0.92
1.83
2.29
4.58
9.16
18.32
IN RUSSELL-NCREIF VALUE WEIGHTED PORTFOLIOS
AVERAGE PROPERTY VALUES & DISTRIBUTION)
WARE
0.01
0.03
0.07
0.14
0.27
0.55
0.69
1.37
2.74
5.49
6.86
13.71
27.43
54.85
R&D
0.01
0.02
0.04
0.08
0.15
0.31
0.38
0.76
1.53
3.05
3.82
7.63
15.27
30.53
APT TOTAL
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.10
0.13
0.26
0.52
1.04
1.30
2.59
5.18
10.36
0.04
0.08
0.19
0.39
0.78
1.55
1.94
3.88
7.77
15.53
19.41
38.83
77.65
155.30
RUSSELL-NCREIF DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY VALUES
(000,000)
Office $6,290 41%
Retail $3,547 23%
Warehouse $2,676 17%
R&D / Office $1,915 12%
Apartment $1,059 7%
TOTAL $15,487 100%
* THE "OTHER" PROPERTY TYPE ACCOUNTING FOR 2% OF INDEX HAS BEEN EXCLUDED.
** THRESHOLD ALLOCATION FOR PRIMARY ASSET CLASS TO ACQUIRE INDEX PORTFOLIO
WITH TEN PROPERTIES FALLS BETWEEN $100 - $200 MILLION ALLOCATION.
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In the property specific portfolios created in Exhibit 4, the
Alternative Asset Class group will need to have a plan size
of $500 million to be able to purchase property directly.
Warehouse and R&D buildings offer the first opportunity for
investment. It is interesting to note that with the given
set of assumptions, only the top 500 or so plans in the
country will even have the asset base necessary to purchase
properties directly. In order to be able to purchase the
least expensive properties, the Primary Asset Class group
will need to have a plan size in excess of $500 million. At
the extreme of expensive properties would be a portfolio of
retail centers, which can only be purchased by the top 162
plans with assets in excess of $2 billion.
Exhibit 5 reflects the number of Russell-NCREIF average
properties that are in portfolios of the calculated
allocation levels. If an investor wanted to use the index as
a "proxy" for a desired portfolio, they could attempt to
allocate it using these percentages. In this instance, a
value-weighted portfolio of ten or more Russell-NCREIF index
portfolio properties can only be acquired by plans with
assets in excess of $1 billion.
Exhibit 6 shows a set of practical investment options
available to plans with $50 million - $20 billion in assets.
Vehicles being considered are CREFs, separate accounts and
direct investment. This list is not all-inclusive; other
vehicles are certainly available as viable options for plan
investment, and are in various stages of maturity and
development. Although these other options are not analyzed
EXHIBIT 6
PRAGMATIC REAL ESTATE ALLOCATION STRATEGIES FOR PENSION PLANS OF
PLAN SIZE (000,000)
$50
ALTERNATIVE ASSET CLASS (1-2% ALLOCATION)
ALLOCATION:
c en R~:
I]5 million
- ion
(1 advisor)
$50 MILLION - $20 BILLION IN ASSETS
PRIMARY ASSET CLASS (5-10% ALLOCATION)
ALLOCATION:
sen-nd orcose -end CREFs: ( advisors)
ALLOCATION:
ose end CREFs:
ALLOCAT ION:
cs end ored-end CRE Fs:
ALLOCATION:
ALLOCATION:
Doieor SA.CR:
on
( advisor)
avIsor )
on
- 10 mil ion
-4 advisors)
W ehouse
ALLOCATION:
Open-end orse -end CREFs:
ALLOCATION:
ose en CREFs:
ALLOCATION:
c eiA CREFs:
on
I tI8S mIt lion
( -4 advisors)
mg~o
-5 advisors)
(advisors)
A LOCATION: m on A LOCAT m
~.~nd r 10 I8 mttion&~n-e~or III] Io8nt
$1,000 osed-end CREFs: edvis o n ooseu e nd CREFs: ( aisorg)
irect or S.A-: 7Qf'Pfj0  15Warehouse girect or S.A-: I Uoeouse
- R 1 Apartment R
ALLOCATION: t ion ALLOCATION: r 1 mittion
$2,000 closed-en CREFs: 185 qdvisrs) tose-end CREFs: isors
Direct or S.A.: ffceiet oil Direct or S.A.: 14e- 551 Warehouse
ware R&D N FAprtment
Apartment' s CRIEIF. nexPor tyo to proper tiles
A LOCATION: m A AOCTI $ million
$5,00 en-end or 51O~- 1Qmitonene M or 1M 18~W mit ion5,000 osed-end CREFs: 
-5a18ir) osed-end CREFs:i'lrect or S.A.: }0 icc ?4 ejR&D irect or S.A.; Wa R0sll
-5 Warhue; 
- R&D War ussell:NApar tmen t 113( Aperme 1 st
NCREIF ndx Po tio properties
ALLOCATION: - flion ALLOCATION: on 1
$10,000 s -eo S EFs: sors ose end CREFs: - ors
Direct or S.A.: H~c -8~ti Direct or S.A.: , 0t gc& O-4Rt
1Wareuse R 8 Warei use; 1 i 4D
N NCR F~p n oto properties
ALOCATION:
Open-end or
closed-end CREFs:
Direct or S.A. :
- m on
0 i 8 R1i R a
Waremnoi Russell-
NCREIF ndex Po folio properties
AL LOCATION:
Open-end or
8 1 osed-end CREFs:i1rect or S.A.:
bt b lion
-1 M ice; 40- 1
-17 Warehouse; 5 R
NCR tment x Pr Russell
NCREIF Porifolio properties
* Direct or separ eb Mt vestnsrs u eusivs se t roc and Ru seLINCREIF nd r otis R
a1$A2 len i n es an Ru t a R i ix Po r P r A se C s a a O ice propertiesOtpropert es .R Russe tTNRE Ineortfo i roper ties.
$100
$200
$500
$20,000
in this exhibit, they could be incorporated with similar
techniques. Also, as the purpose of the exhibit is to
consider the opportunity for investing in certain vehicles,
the many combinations that could occur among these
investments are not presented.
Exhibit 6 applies primarily to defined benefit plan
investors. Unless defined contribution plans implement
policies that limit the liquidity constraints present in
participant-directed plans, most traditional real estate
vehicles will not be practical investments for them.
However, investments such as REITs and newly evolving
securitized forms would be effective ways for these plans to
invest; these forms will not have many of the divisibility
problems prevalent in other vehicles.
Because of the wide variety of open-end and closed-end CREFs
available at unit prices beginning at $250,000, it is assumed
that these investments could be made at every level of
allocation by both Alternative Asset and Primary Asset
classes. Plans using these vehicles to diversify will need
to identify advisors implementing MPT strategy, or will need
to execute multifund strategy that includes careful analysis
of the composition of the plan, the fund and each individual
advisor's strategy.
Several assumptions were made in this exhibit. First,
although funds are available in a variety of sizes, it was
assumed that another advisor will not be chosen until at
least $5 million was available for real estate, leaving $2.5
70
million for each of these first advisors. In attempting to
diversify under the Primary Asset Class, the plan will want
to maximize the number of advisors up to a level of five,
which appears to be representative of large portfolio
practice. However, a limit would be set that no advisor
manage in excess of $100 million; this will require the
addition of advisors past five as the allocation exceeds $500
million. Since plans with Alternative Asset Class
investments are not primarily concerned with diversification,
they will accept as few as one advisor, depending on
opportunities for return. Neither class will want to assume
the burden of managing an inordinant number of advisors; a
limit of ten advisors will apply to both classes. These
limits suggest that $1 billion will be the maximum allocation
that a plan will make to advisors, without considering
in-house management.
The Alternative Asset Class group will not be searching for
diversification; it will be only looking to maximize the
return of its small allocation. As mentioned previously,
this group will not be able to purchase directly or by
separate account until it reaches a plan size of $500 million
in assets. These investors may prefer higher risk, niche
products.
At a plan size of $1 billion, the Primary Asset Class group
will be able to make direct purchases. At this level, the
plan will be able to purchase a portfolio with ten
properties. At $2 billion, a plan will be able to purchase
the "index" portfolio with ten properties.
There is a high cost of entry for direct purchases or
separate account investment. Coinvestment, the combination
of two or more plans to conduct these types of purchases,
serves to overcome this hurdle. For this reason, it is
becoming a popular plan vehicle for acquiring property
directly or by separate account.
Plans must also decide whether management functions are best
handled in-house or by external management. The size of the
real estate allocation will be the primary determinant of
this decision. Certain economies will occur with increasing
allocations and internal operations which will allow the plan
to reduce management costs by eliminating the profit margin
of the advisory firms. However, if reduced returns accompany
the decision to bring the operation in-house, the savings in
operating costs may not justify the elimination of external
managers. Since internal management will be measured against
other "prudent experts," the capabilities and motivation of
sponsors to implement strategy will also be a critical part
of this decision.
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CHAPTER V: Conclusions
Various factors of influence impact the ability of a plan to
implement a particular real estate investment strategy. As
seen in Chapter Three, many of the factors are qualitative in
nature, yet still must be considered in the formulation of
strategy. Chapter Four examined certain quantitative factors
of influence under the premise that certain investment
strategies will only be available to plans of appropriate
sizes. Factors examined were plan size, level of real estate
allocation and the asset characteristic of divisibility.
A general framework was created using a combination of
industry averages and conventional wisdom from the real
estate and pension industries. Strategies were examined for
plans of $50 million to $20 billion in assets. As expected,
it was determined that the most real estate investment
strategies are available to the largest pension plans in the
country. Under the chosen set of assumptions, plans looking
for a diversified portfolio of properties need to have a
minimum of $1 billion in assets. This indicates that only
the top 318 plans in the U.S. will be able to actively
implement MPT-based strategies by direct purchase or separate
accounts. Plans under this size will purchase shares of
CREFs or REITs.
Plan sponsors can utilize this simple framework in
combination with the qualitative factors described in Chapter
Three to perform initial analyses of strategies available for
their investment in real estate. Of course, the framework
can be altered to reflect allocation levels appropriate for a
particular plan and to include other types of real estate
investment vehicles under consideration.
When selecting a strategy, a plan sponsor must not lose sight
of the plan's purpose of providing retirement benefits to
participants. Ultimately, a sponsor's performance will be
measured by comparison to other fiduciaries and in the timely
payment of these benefits.
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